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 QUÉBEC/CANADA 
FRASER INSTITUTE 
S. Lafleur, B. Eisen, M. Palacios et al., 
« Alberta’s Budget Deficit: Why Spending 
Is to Blame, 2017 », 26 janvier 2017, 12 p. 
Les problèmes fiscaux de l’Alberta sont 
causés notamment par la hausse rapide 
des dépenses de programme 
Alberta currently faces significant fiscal chal-
lenges. The province is projected to run a budget 
deficit of $10.8 billion this year and accumulate 
tens of billions of dollars in debt in the years 
ahead.  
However, the causes of these fiscal challenges are 
misunderstood. The government, for instance, fre-
quently asserts that the recent drop in oil prices is 
responsible for Alberta’s fiscal problems. This is, 
at very best, an oversimplification.  
While there is no doubt that the recent plunge in 
commodity prices beginning in late 2014 has been 
harmful to Alberta’s public finances, the provin-
cial government’s reliance on deficit spending to 
fund its operations predates the onset of the com-
modity price slump. In fact, Alberta has run a 
budget deficit every year except for one since 
2008/09, with the result being a significant deteri-
oration in the province’s financial position that be-
gan long before the current oil price slump.  
The reality is that the primary cause of the fiscal 
challenges Alberta faces today is rapid program 
spending growth by successive governments start-
ing more than a decade ago. Indeed, successive Al-
berta governments spent like the good times 
would never end. But when they inevitably did 
end, spending remained at a level that revenues 
could not support. 
INSTITUT C.D. HOWE 
W. Robson, « Enduring Virtues: Saving 
and Investing as National Priorities for 
Canada in 2017 », 31 janvier 2017, 20 p. 
Comment utiliser la fiscalité comme outil 
pour améliorer le taux d’épargne des 
contribuables canadiens 
Sagging national saving, undermined by govern-
ment deficits, threaten Canada’s future economic 
prosperity, according to a new report from the 
C.D. Howe Institute. In “Enduring Virtues: Sav-
ing and Investing as National Priorities in 2017,” 
author William B.P. Robson, President and CEO 
of the C.D. Howe Institute, underlines the im-
portance of saving and investment in economic 
growth, and warns that Canada is falling short. 
“We Canadians are consuming like there’s no to-
morrow,” says Robson. “Our national saving rate 
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has plummeted and government deficits are mak-
ing it worse. We need more saving and investment 
to boost national wealth and future incomes,” he 
adds. 
The report explains how forgoing consumption to-
day provides resources for the housing, capital, in-
frastructure and investments abroad that boost 
living standards tomorrow. But over the year to 
the third quarter of 2016, Canadians consumed 98 
percent of national disposable income. At 2 per-
cent, our national saving rate was way below the 
average above 7 percent recorded since the mid-
1990s.  
The problem is not so much our individual behav-
iour: households saved almost $1,700 per person. 
But losses by businesses – and, more important, 
governments running deficits – reduced national 
saving to barely $900 per Canadian. 
“Such weak saving meant that, to finance net in-
vestment that totaled $3,200 per Canadian, we 
had to borrow more than $2,300 per Canadian 
abroad,” notes Robson. Not necessarily bad – but 
about $2,800 of that investment was in housing. 
“Capital spending by businesses and governments 
– projects likelier to improve our capacity to ex-
port and service foreign debt – barely exceeded de-
preciation.” 
   ÉTATS-UNIS 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
H. Katch et J. Solomon, « Are Medicaid 
Incentives an Effective Way to Improve 
Health Outcomes? », 24 janvier 2017, 8 p. 
Imposer une taxe pour avoir accès aux 
salles d'attente dans les hôpitaux 
pourrait avoir un effet négatif sur la 
santé des patients 
State Medicaid programs are testing a number of 
approaches to improve beneficiaries’ health out-
comes by encouraging them to engage in healthy 
behaviors and to use the health care system more 
efficiently. While states may be tempted to offer 
incentives or penalties to increase primary care 
and reduce emergency room visits, the evidence 
shows that these programs are unlikely to achieve 
their goals. Improving access to care through co-
ordination and transportation are more likely to 
improve Medicaid beneficiaries’ health and offer 
states a return on their investment. Some states 
impose penalties, such as levying cost-sharing 
charges or limiting access to certain benefits such 
as adult dental and vision services, for beneficiar-
ies who don’t pay premiums or complete certain 
activities such as health assessments or preven-
tive care visits. Two programs operating in this 
manner — programs in West Virginia and Indiana 
— have produced disappointing results. These 
programs have led to increases in emergency de-
partment (ED) visits among people whose access 
to primary care was limited under these pro-
grams. 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
R. Kogan, « Constitutional Balanced Bud-
get Amendment Poses Serious Risks », 
18 janvier 2017, 10 p. 
Amender la constitution pour forcer un 
budget équilibré pourrait avoir des 
conséquences désastreuses sur 
l’économie 
A balanced budget amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution would be a highly ill-advised way to address 
the nation’s long-term fiscal problems. It would 
threaten significant economic harm while raising 
a host of problems for the operation of Social Se-
curity and other vital federal programs.  
The economic problems are the most serious. By 
requiring a balanced budget every year, no matter 
the state of the economy, such an amendment 
would raise serious risks of tipping weak econo-
mies into recession and making recessions longer 
and deeper, causing very large job losses. That’s 
because the amendment would force policymakers 
to cut spending, raise taxes, or both just when the 
economy is weak or already in recession — the ex-
act opposite of what good economic policy would 
advise.  
When the economy slows, federal revenues decline 
or grow more slowly and spending on unemploy-
ment insurance and other social programs in-
creases, causing deficits to rise. Rather than al-
lowing the “automatic stabilizers” of lower tax col-
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lections and higher unemployment and other ben-
efits to cushion a weak economy, the amendment 
would force policymakers to cut spending, raise 
taxes, or both. That would launch a vicious spiral 
of bad economic and fiscal policy:  a weaker econ-
omy would lead to higher deficits, which would 
force policymakers to cut spending or raise taxes 
more, which would weaken the economy further. 
INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY (ITEP) 
ITEP, « Fairness Matters: A Chart Book 
on Who Pays State and Local Taxes », 
Janvier 2017, 25 p. 
Les États américains qui ont un faible 
impôt sur le revenu et qui imposent 
fortement la consommation ont des 
systèmes fiscaux parmi les plus 
iniquitables 
There is significant room for improvement in state 
and local tax codes. Income tax laws are filled with 
top-heavy exemptions and deductions. Sales tax 
bases are too narrow and need updating. And ove-
rall tax collections are often inadequate in the 
short-run and unsustainable in the long-run. In 
this light, the growing interest in tax reform 
among state lawmakers across the country is wel-
come news.  
Too often, however, would-be tax reformers have 
proposed policy changes that would worsen one of 
the most undesirable features of state and local 
tax systems: their lopsided impact on taxpayers at 
varying income levels. Nationwide, the bottom 20 
percent of earners pay 10.9 percent of their income 
in state and local taxes each year. Middle-income 
families pay a slightly lower 9.4 percent average 
rate. But the top 1 percent of earners pay just 5.4 
percent of their income in such taxes. This is the 
definition of regressive, upside-down tax policy.  
State and local tax systems add to the nation’s 
growing income inequality problem when they 
capture a greater share of income from low- or 
moderateincome taxpayers. Further, state tax 
systems that ask the most of families with the 
least are not well-suited to generate the revenues 
needed to fund schools, health care, infrastruc-
ture, and other public services that are crucial to 
building thriving communities. This problem is 
particularly acute in the long run since regressive 
tax systems depend more heavily on low-income 
families that face stagnating incomes while taxing 
the superrich, whose wealth and incomes continue 
to grow, at lower rates.  
As the information in this chart book helps illus-
trate, it does not have to be this way. States vary 
considerably in the fairness of their tax codes, and 
pursuing policies adopted by states with the least 
regressive tax systems is a proven strategy for re-
ducing tax inequity.  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 
JCT, « Estimating Changes in the  
Federal Individual Income Tax: Explo-
ring the Elasticity of Taxable Income »,  
30 janvier 2017, 50 p. 
Les contribuables ne sont pas regroupés 
aux abords des tranches d’imposition, 
mais ils peuvent l’être aux seuils de 
certains crédits d’impôt 
In response to changes in marginal income tax 
rates, behavioral changes such as new tax plan-
ning to reduce income subject to higher tax rates, 
tax avoidance transactions, and tax evasion are 
included in the estimates. For example, an in-
crease in the ordinary income tax rate may result 
in an increased use of deferred compensation or an 
attempt to convert ordinary income into capital 
gain income. That is, taxpayers alter the timing 
and composition of the taxable income they report 
in response to changes in marginal tax rates. 
Economists refer to this behavioral response as 
the elasticity of taxable income. As part of the pro-
cess of estimating the budgetary effects of pro-
posed changes in the nation’s tax law, the Joint 
Committee staff applies a series of taxable income 
elasticities that vary by income groups. This ap-
proach is based on empirical research suggesting 
that taxable income elasticities are lower for 
lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income 
taxpayers. Consequently, the series of taxable in-
come elasticities employed by the Joint Commit-
tee staff rises with income. 
 
 
 4 
   INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 
(IFS) 
S. Adam, H. Miller et T. Pope, « Tax, legal 
form and the gig economy », 2 février 
2017, 36 p.  
L’avantage fiscal d’un travailleur 
indépendant équivaut à une subvention 
de 1 240 livres sterling par année 
This a pre-released chapter from the forthcoming 
IFS Green Budget 2017.  
Company owner-managers can pay themselves in 
(more lightly taxed) dividends, and possibly capi-
tal gains, rather than just wages. Along with the 
self-employed, they also have more opportunities 
to avoid or evade taxes. 
The tax system has long encouraged people to 
work for their own business rather than be an em-
ployee. Lower tax rates are not justified by diffe-
rences in employment rights or compliance 
burdens and are not well targeted at encouraging 
entrepreneurship. 
Similar individuals can face very different tax 
burdens. This is unfair and creates economic inef-
ficiency. Some people set up a business when, ab-
sent tax, they would be an employee. Much time 
and effort goes into policing the boundaries bet-
ween legal forms. 
Saving and investment should be deductible from 
the tax base. Each extra pound of income earned 
should then be taxed at the same overall rates for 
employees, the self-employed and company 
owner-managers. This would simultaneously deal 
with many problems that plague the tax system. 
 
 
Équipe de rédaction 
Recherche et sélection des articles : 
Fanny Panneton, Francis Brault, Francis 
Landry, Josué Bosiakali et Karman Kong 
Coordination, édition et révision :  
Tommy Gagné-Dubé 
 
 
http://cffp.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/ 
 
Pour vous abonner gratuitement 
au Bulletin de veille et aux 
publications de la Chaire :  
cffp.eg@USherbrooke.ca  
